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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY SHOPPING CENTER NO. 3, 
a corporation, AMERICAN HOME AS-
SURANCE COMPANY, a corporation and 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMP ANY, a 
corporation, 
Respondents-Plaintiffs 
vs. 
SUMNER J. HATCH and ROBERT M. 
McRAE, 
Appellants-Defendants 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
11188 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs-respondents represent the interests of 
those who were robbed of about $2500.00 cash. Plaintiffs 
contend that the defendants-appellants, as attorneys for the 
robbers, obtained the stolen cash from their clienrts with 
notice that it was loot. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury who unanimously found 
that defendants obtained $2,115.40 with notice that it was 
loot. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the verdict and judgment 
below. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants' statement of facts requires some elabora-
tion. 
'I'he grocery store, on 1st South and 7th East, was rob-
bed by two (3) armed and masked men at about 8:50 p.m. 
on December 19, 1964 (R. 98). The police, store personnel 
and insurer of the store investigated the loss and deter-
mined the loss at aproximately $2,431.37 (R. 120, 175, 301, 
Ex. P-1). 
Within a few hours of the robbery, police apprehended 
and arrested Wayne Johnson and George Stockton at the 
latter's residence, a few blocks from the store. There the 
officers found the following: 
A cardboard box marked "Valley No. 7" in the base-
ment (R. 129, 164, 165) 
$124.00 in currency and rolled coins in the bottom of 
a clothes hamper filled with dirty clothes (R. 
130, 131, 162) 
$10.00 cash in rolled dimes and $2.00 in rolled 
nickles under a plastic doll (R. 131) 
$320.00 in $20 bills in a closet on a shelf (R. 132) 
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About $790.00, consisting of 100-$1 bills, 25-$5's, 19-
$10's and 7-$20's, and rolls of nickles, dimes 
and quarters, 1921 and 1891 silver dollars, and 
16 Kennedy half dollars, all in a suitcase on the 
back porch (R. 133, 134, 163, 164) 
A new $1 bill under edge of buffet (R. 133) 
A torn wrapper used for $100 bills (R. 163) 
1 pair of black and 1 pair of red leather gloves (R. 
133) 
2 automatic pistols, one of which was loaded (R. 
129, 133) 
At the police station $320.00 or $332.00 was taken from 
the person of Wayne Johnson (R. 140, 141, 145). 
Workman was arrested upon information obtained 
from Stockton (R. 138, 167). 
Robbery charges were filed against Johnson, Stockton 
and Workman (R. 187, 203, 204, 210, 276). 
The next evening Stockton took the officers to the 
apartment of his daughter at 720 - 2nd A venue, also just a 
few blocks from the store and from Stockton's residence, 
where another $550.00 in $20 bills was obtained (R. 165, 
212, 213, 305,306, 307) 
All of the aforedescribed money, totaling approximate-
ly $2117.00, was itemized and placed as evidence in the evi-
dence room of the Salt Lake City Police Department in con-
nection with the robbery case (R. 135, 144, 167, 168). 
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Johnson, Stockton and Workman were interrogated 
and subjected to a line-up (R. 166, 167, 172, 173). A com-
prehensive written report of the incident was filed by De-
tective Nicholson (R. 142, 144). 
Workman plead guiity to the robbery (R. 155). How-
ever, the robbery charges against Stockton and Johnson 
were ultimately dismissed because Stockton had his proba-
tion revoked and Johnson plead guilty to still another rob-
bery charge (R. 152). 
At the time of the robbery Johnson was being sought 
by the police all over the country (R. 169, 184, 261). John-
son had no gainful employment immediately before the rob-
bery (R. 184). Stockton had not worked since 1960 (R. 201). 
Johnson, Stockton and Workman had made their initial as-
sociations at the State Prison (R. 199, 207). 
Stockton retained Attorney McRae, who ascertained 
that Stockton was held on probation violation charges and 
potential charges of forgery, robbery and burglary (R. 231, 
232. 243, 269, 270, 271, 272), McRae was aware the money 
was impounded in evidence and recognized the possibility 
that it belonged to someone besides Stockton (R. 243). 
McRae did not diligently look into the ownership of the 
money (R. 240, 255). McRae knew that the Kennedy half 
dollars and the old silver dollars were picked up at Stock-
ton's home (R. 241, 242). 
Wayne Johnson retained defendant Hatch, who asked 
Johnson "questions" when they first consulted (R. 195). 
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Hatch and McRae, who were engaged in a joint venture 
in the criminal defense work (R. 225), obtained assign-
ments from Johnson and Stockton of all their interest in 
the monies in the evidence room (R. 211, 212, 234). 
Defendants knew the investigating detectives by their 
first names (R. 151, 226) and thus probed them for infor-
mation (R. 241, 143, 152, 173, 174, 315). Defendants knew 
the police were pushing the robbery charges (R. 241, 260), 
and knew they could get police records (R. 150, 170). With-
out notice to the robbery victims (R. 282) defendants ob-
tained court orders from City Judge Horace Beck releasing 
about $2,160.22 of the currency and rolled coins from the 
evidence room to defendants between December 29, 1964 
and January 19, 1965 (R. 237, 238, 239). Before the latter 
date Johnson was charged with another robbery (R. 292). 
The defendant attorneys apparently relied on technicalities 
of identifying the money to obtain the court orders (R. 240, 
244, 274, 280, 290). The County Attorney's office essentially 
offered the same proof had on the instant trial and vigor-
ously resisted the orders (R. 250, 264, 278, 285). However, 
defendants did not seek the silver dollars or the Kennedy 
half dollars (R. 239, 241, 242, 294). 
At the instant trial Johnson, Workman and Stockton 
testified. Johnson and Workman were prison inmates at 
that time (R. 182, 207). All three of them gave pertinent 
testimony and on occasion took the Fifth Amendment (R. 
208, 211, 213). Mrs. Stockton could not recall anything and 
"knew" nothing (R. 197, 198). 
Stockton testified that he had never had $1,000 cash in 
his home (R. 211). Yet in an assignment to Attorneys Mc-
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Rae and Hatch, Stockton assigned all of his interest in the 
money found at his residence and his daughter's (about 
$1800.00) (R. 212). 
Although Johnson gave an assignment of his interest 
in the monies picked up at Stockton's home, Johnson re-
fusec~ to state whether he claimed some interest in those 
monies, on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him 
(R. 188-192, 287, 288, Ex. D-2). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY ON THE APPLICABLE 
STANDARD OF LAW 
The court instructed that the defendants had "no ob-
ligation to make an independent inquiry as to the owner-
ship of the funds they may receive from their clients, unless 
they had sufficient notice prior to the receipt of same, to 
put a reasonable and prudent man on inquiry to avoid tak-
ing funds belonging to someone else. Information that 
would put a reasonable, prudent man on such an inquiry 
as to the ownership of the funds would constitute the notice 
referred to in proposition No. 2 of the verdit (R. 65, Instr. 
9B). 
The jury found that the defendants received the money 
with "notice or knowledge that it had been stolen" (R. 55, 
Prop. No. 2). 
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Defendants' own requested instruction No. 4 (R. 60), 
(essentially adopted by the court in its instructions Nos. 
9A, B, and C) provided that the defendants had no obliga-
tion to make an independent inquiry as to the source of the 
funds "if they had no clear or convincing evidence to the 
contrary." 
36 Am. Jur., Money §6, cited by defendants, describes 
good faith as "without notice or knowledge of its tainted 
character" and goes on to say: 
"The authorities are agreed that it is not sufficient 
that the receiver of stolen money act in good faith 
and without notice of its tainted character; he must 
also have parted with a valuable consideration 
therefor; and hence, if he is a mere depository for 
the thief, the money may be recovered from him; 
or if he parts with it after notice that it was stolen 
money, he will be liable to the true owner there-
for ... 
"It is said that at the present time there is substan-
tially no difference in the rule applicable to the 
rights of a person receiving stolen money and re-
ceiving stolen negotiable instruments which are 
complete on their face ... " 
Although there is some confusion even under negoti-
able instruments law, it is submitted that the folowing au-
thorities are in accord with the instructions of the court in 
the instant case: 
"If circumstances exist as to the purchase of stolen 
paper which are calculated to raise suspicion in the 
mind of an ordinary man of prudence and discretion, 
such a purchaser will be prevented from acquiring 
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title better than that of his vendor." 8 Am. Jur., 
Bills and Notes, §619, pp. 332-333 
In 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes §§425 et seq., even 
the discussion of the subjective test ultimately falls back on 
a discussion of objective standards: "Knowledge of facts 
which render the taking dishonest" or "facts known to the 
taker ... such as to reasonably form the basis for an infer-
ence that in acquiring the instrument with knowledge of 
such facts, he acted in dishonest regard of the rights of 
(others)." 
In 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes §323, it states: 
"If a party has knowledge of facts or circumstances 
involved in the negotiation of a note, the legal effect 
of which would avoid the transfer to him, he cannot 
claim as a holder in due course, no matter how hon-
estly he may have believed that the law would sus-
tain the transfer." 
In First National Bank v. Trebin, (Ohio) 52 N.E. 834, 
we find: 
"Good faith is not measured by a man's own stan-
dard of right, but by a standard for the observance 
of all men in their dealings with one another." 
In Ward v. City Trust, (NY) 84 N.E. 585, it states: 
"One who suspects, or ought to suspect, is bound to 
inquire, and the law presumes that he knows what-
ever proper inquiry would disclose." 
When the defendants had knowledge that the money 
was impounded as evidence in the robbery case, such is 
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equivalent to a person taking a negotiable instrument 
which is altered and irregular on its face. In such a case 
there is a duty to inquire and discover the facts which a 
prudent purchaser would discover. See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills 
and Notes, §448. 
In Sinclair v. Houston, (Texas) 268 SW2d 290, cited in 
defendant's brief, the court reaffirmed that it is against 
public policy to protect a gambler who has won stolen 
money. In the instant case it is clearly against the public 
interest to permit the loot to be used to the advantage of the 
robbers in their own defense of that very robbery. 
Also in Sinclair v. Houston, the court apparently ap-
proved an objective standard by stating that it is "unnec-
essary to determine whether the evidence would have sup-
ported a finding that the appellee, in the exercise of reason-
able care, would have concluded from the heavy losses sus-
tained by an assistant treasurer ... that he was not losing 
his own money." 
At trial the defendants should have had, but did not 
have, the burden of proving their good faith and lack of 
notice or knowledge, once it was established that the money 
belonged to the plaintiffs or had infirmities. 
In Warren v. Smith 35 Ut. 455, 100 P.1069, the court 
stated: 
"It is also well settled that when the loss by the 
original owner or the theft from him is proven, the 
burden of proof shifts, and the holder must show 
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that he acquired it bona fide for value and before 
maturity, or from someone who had a perfect title." 
See also Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar, 74 Ut. 24, 
276 P.659; Lembo v. Federici, (Wash.) 385 P2d 312; and 12 
Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §1204. 
In National Bank v. Price, 65 Ut. 57, 234 P. 231, the 
court quoted at pages 240 <md 241: 
"It is ordinarily to be expected in these cases that 
the purchaser will testify to his good faith and want 
of notice and that defendant is compelled to rely 
upon circumstantial evidence to rebut such show-
ing. Whether plaintiff has sufficiently sustained the 
burden resting upon him and made good his claim 
to be an innocent purchaser is therefore a question 
for the jury ... A categorical denial of notice or 
knowledge is something which in many, if not in 
most, instances cannot be opposed by direct proof; 
and the credibilily of the witnesses, their interest in 
the case, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of 
their statements, the time, place and manner of the 
transaction, its conformity to or departure from the 
ordinary methods of business, and all other facts 
and circumstances which, though of slight moment 
in themselves, yet when taken together give char-
acter and color to the purchase under inquiry, ... 
(O)bserving this principle, it has frequently been 
held that a denial of notice by the purchaser, though 
he be uncontradicted by any other witness, is not 
sufficient to justify a directed verdict in his favor." 
In USF&G v. Eades, (W.Va.) 144 S.E.2d, p. 709, the 
court stated: 
"A purchaser (of negotiable instrument) takes with 
notice only where he has actual knowledge or 
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knowledge of facts which make it bad faith on his 
part not to inquire or discover evidence of inequi-
ties, and certain facts or circumstances may or may 
not constitute notice, actual or imputed because of 
the failure to inquire." 
In any event, whether the duty to inquire be dis-
cussed in terms of subjectivity or objectivity, the evidence 
is without dispute in this case that the defendants, in spite 
of any real inquiry, did, in fact have notice and knowledge 
that the money was loot. The defendants did not, and could 
never, under the circumstances, meet the burden of show-
ing their innocence and good faith. 
Even the Kelly Kar case, cited by plaintiff in his brief, 
(298 P2d 590,) states: 
"So long as he buys in good faith and exercises all 
the precautions as to title that the reasonable man 
would exercise, and so long as he is not put on no-
tice ... the transaction was valid. . . . (I )f he was 
put on such notice as a reasonably prudent man 
would have interpreted to be tantamount to a dec-
laration by the thief that the chattel had been pur-
chased with stolen money, he cannot retain the 
movable against the innocent victim of the rob-
bery." 
10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §324, pp. 820 and 821, states: 
"It would seem that what might be bad faith on the 
part of one person engaged in one occupation be-
cause of his failure to make inquiry, might not be 
bad faith on the part of a person engaged in another 
occupation." 
Attorneys are required to act as reasonable, prudent 
men, particularly where their own interests are competing 
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with their client's interests and the interests of third par-
ties, such as the victims of a robbery, law enforcement 
agencies and the public. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANTS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND AS A MAT-
TER OF FACT 
In a nearly identical case of McKinley v. Smith, (Calif.) 
17 P2d 1032, involving an attorney plaintiff, the court said: 
"The record further shows that at the time that the 
plaintiff presented his assignment signed by Rus-
sell Hill, purporting to transfer the ownership of 
the money in question from Russell Hill to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff specifically excepted in his de-
mand upon the chief of police the turning over and 
delivery to him of the $10 bill of which bank had 
the serial number, and taken from the possession of 
Russell Hill. Why the plaintiff did not want all of 
the money is sufficiently apparent from what we 
have said, and needs no further comment. 
"The record further shows that at the time of the 
assignment upon which the plaintiff bases his right 
of action, and prior thereto, he knew that Russell 
Hill was confined in the county jail of the county of 
Stanislaus, in the city of Modesto, charged with rob-
bing the Modesto Branch of the American Trust 
Company. This fixes the fact that the plaintiff is 
not in the position of an innocent holder, and took 
no better title than that possessed by Russell Hill, 
the man identified, beyond any reasonably contro-
versy, as the one who held up the bank. 
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"In addition to what we have said, the record shows 
that Russell Hill was arrested in St. Joseph, Mo., 
about two weeks after the robbery of the bank in 
Modesto. The marked $10 bill had not been paid out 
to any other person, and it could not have come into 
the possession of Russell Hill unless he were the one 
who had robbed the bank, or had obtained the bill 
from someone who had robbed the bank. The record 
being practically incontrovertible that Russell Hill 
was the one who robbed the bank, the jury could 
not reasonably have come to any other conclusion 
than that Russell Hill was the person who robbed 
the bank, obtained possession of the marked bill, 
and took it with him with the other moneys found in 
his possession, to St. Joseph, Mo. Under these cir-
cumstances no jury could reasonably come to any 
other conclusion than that Russell Hill was the one 
who robbed the bank of the bank of the $1548, and 
still had in his possession, as a part thereof, the cur-
rency which was found upon him at the time of his 
arrest. 
"(T)he jury had a right to take into consideration as 
to where Russell Hill had obtained the money when 
he was asked by the chief of police if he had any-
thing to say, and he replied, 'I ain't saying any-
thing.' No one who had obtained the money hon-
estly would have made such an answer. After the 
bank had been robbed the insurance carrier of the 
bank, took an assignment of the bank's claim, was 
allowed to intervene herein, and was found by the 
jury to be the owner of the money involved in this 
action. 
"In view of the foregoing, we do not deem it neces-
sary to enter into any technical discussion of the 
instruction given by the trial court to the jury, nor 
of the requested instructions that were refused, fur-
ther than to say that a reading of the instructions 
shows that the jury was fairly and fully instructed, 
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and that no error is disclosed sufficient ot warrant 
any reversal, if error there be. 
"We do not deem it necessary to cite any authorities 
in this case, as what we have said, as disclosed by 
the record, is sufficient to satisfy any reasonable 
man that the money involved herein was a part of 
the currency stolen by Russell Hill, from the bank 
in Modesto, and that anyone taking an assignment 
from him, with knowledge, would acquire no title." 
Stiller v. Rogers, (Calif.) 159 P.456, is in the same con-
text. There a woman stole $900. At the time of her arrest 
the police found $501 on her person which was deposited 
with the sheriff. Most of the money was in $50 bills. There-
after, her attorney received a written order upon the sheriff 
to pay $200 of the deposited moneys as attorneys' fees. 
After some resistance by the sheriff, the money was turned 
over to the attorney. In affirming the trial court, the ap-
pellate court found that the defendant either "knew or 
should have known that at least part of the money so re-
ceived by him were stolen funds .... "and stated: 
"In accepting employment ... he must have known 
that she was charged with the theft ... from the 
plaintiff .... (H)e knew from both her and the sher-
iff that a considerable sum had been found on her 
person at her arrest and had been impounded ... 
"Such facts would seem to deprive the defendant of 
the benefit of receiving the assignment of the cur-
rency ... as being one who paid value therefor in 
good faith, without notice of the theft of such 
money." 
"A purchaser ... cannot shut his eyes to the sur-
rounding circumstances, and where the circum-
stances are so cogent and obvious that to remain 
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passive would constitute bad faith or as such is to 
justify the conclusion that failure to make such in-
quiry arose from a suspicion that inquiry would dis-
cluse a vice or defect in the instrument of transac-
tion, such purchaser is charged with knowledge. In-
tentional ignorance, such as a wilful evasion of 
knowledge of the facts, constitutes bad faith dis-
qualifying the purchaser from becoming a holder in 
due course. Where circumstances which put him on 
inquiry are within his knowledge, he is chargeable 
with knowledge of all facts which an inquiry would 
have revealed." 
In Hindnwrch v. Hoffman, (Pa.) 18 A. 14, the thief gave 
$1400 loot to the defendant to hold, the defendant not then 
being aware that it was loot. Later, the defendant was ad-
vised by plaintiff's attorney that the plaintiff claimed the 
money. Thereafter, the defendant paid the money on order 
of the thief to a third party. The court held as a matter of 
law that "under these circumstances, it was clearly his duty 
to hold it for plaintiff .... Justice demands that he should 
now be compelled to pay the amount to the rightful owner." 
In Bergheim v. McRae, (Minn.) 252 NW 833, plaintiff, 
as the owner of a note, assigned the note to the bank cashier 
personally. The cashier (McRae) embezzled the money 
from the bank and then endorsed the note to the defendant 
Simon. Affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the court 
stated: 
"The trial court found that Simon acquired the note . 
. . . with knowledge of such circumstances that he 
acted in bad faith ... It found that Simon knew 
that McRae was in financial difficulties and that he 
had embezzled money from the bank and was en-
deavoring to borrow to make up the shortage. He 
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knew that McRae was menaced with criminal pros-
ecutions and ... with all other .... circumstances . 
. . . were sufficient to constitute red lights ahead and 
to cast upon ... defendant .... Simon the duty to 
make inquiries .... The neglect to make inquiry .... 
was more than mere negligence. It was lack of com-
mercial faith. The inquiry most naturally should 
have been directed to the mortgagee (plaintiff). It 
is contended that inasmuch as the appellant dis-
cussed the matter with McRae, his banker and with 
the attorney for the bank, he did everything that an 
honest man should. The record is necessarily silent 
as to what was submitted to the lawyer, and McRae 
was the very man whose title should have been 
scrutinized .... Men of business experience know 
that hard-pressed debtors turn sharp corners and 
are not scrupulous to distinguish between their own 
and the property of others .... Knowledge, not sur-
mise suspicion or fear is necessary. Not knowledge 
of the exact truth, but knowledge of some truth 
that would prevent action by those commercially 
honest men for whom law is made." 
In Lytle v. Lansing, 147 U.S. 59, the court commented: 
"It is incredible that a man should purchase this 
large amount of bonds ($50,000) for half their base 
value without looking at them or even noticing 
whether they were signed or sealed, without mak-
ing any inquiries with regard to the responsibility 
of the town, or the circumstances under which the 
bonds were issued, the non-payment of the overdue 
coupons, or the title of the person (to him an entire 
stranger) through whom he purchased them .... 
(T)he very fact that bonds were offered for sale at 
this large discount, at a place 2,000 miles from 
where they were issued, was of itself a circumstance 
calculated to arouse suspicion of their validity in 
the mind of any person of ordinary intelligence." 
"It is singular as a matter of fact and fatal to a re-
covery as a matter of law that the plaintiff did not 
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act upon the information thus received and at once 
repudiate the transaction and refuse to consummate 
the sale by a deed. 
"While the notice received by the plaintiff may not 
have gone to the extent of informing him of the par-
ticular facts showing the invalidity of the bonds, he 
was informed that the town was contesting its lia-
bility, and that Breckenridge himself was in litiga-
tion with it over the payment of the coupons. Re-
ceiving this information as he did, not only from his 
vendor, but from his own attorneys from whom he 
could have learned all the facts by inquiry, it is 
mere quibbling to say that he had no notice that the 
bonds were invalid. While purchasers of negotiable 
securities are not chargeable with constructive no-
tice of the pendency of a suit affecting the title or 
validity of the securities, it has never been doubted . 
. . . that those who buy such securities from litigat-
ing parties with actual notice of a suit, do so at their 
peril, and must abide the result the same as the 
parties from whom they got their title. Under the 
circumstances it was bad faitb. or wilful ignorance 
... to forebear making further inquiries .... No rule 
of law protects a purchaser who wilfully closes his 
ears to information, or refuses to make inquiry 
when circumstances of grave suspicion impair it." 
11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes §422, at page 478, 
states: 
"The fact that the holder knew that his transferor 
was an emblezzler or thief and was charged or ex-
pected to be charged with crime is sufficient to put 
him on inquiry and establish his bad faith where he 
makes no inquiry as to title to an instrument which 
he takes." 
It is difficult to imagine that the defendants did not in-
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quire directly of their clients concerning the robbery. How-
ever, at trial both the defendants and their clients claimed 
privilege as far as their discussions of the robbery (R. 290). 
The only inference to be drawn is that the attorneys were 
told something by their clients which, if disclosed, would 
tend to involve their clients in the robbery and loot. 
The only explanation Johnson gave was that the 
money the police took from him ($320.00) was won gam-
bling (R. 184-189). Yet, Johnson assigned $1,000 to the de-
fendants (R. 288, Exh. 2). 
Likewise, Stockton failed to give any plausible expla-
nation of his interest in any sum such as $1,000 or more. 
Even if it be assumed that the robbers told the defend-
ants that part of the moneys impounded were from a source 
other than the robbery, can a reasonable man let alone an 
attorney be permitted to take money under those circum-
stances without inquiring of the robbery victims? 
The proceedings before Judge Beck in no way could 
have determined title to the monies, since none of the al-
leged principals involved in title (the robbery victims and 
Stockton and Johnson) appeared as parties or witnesses. 
Apparently only technicalities were discussed by the at-
torneys who were involved in the criminal proceedings 
against Stockton and Johnson. 
Why did defendants leave the silver dollars and Ken-
nedy half dollars in the evidence room, unless they realized 
that such was loot? 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
There is no dispute in the evidence but that before 
taking the money the defendants knew: 
1. That a robbery had taken place involving a few 
thousand dollars. 
2. Their clients were charged with that robbery. 
3. Money, in the form of bills and rolled coins, spe-
cific silver dollars and half dollars, was held as evidence 
and loot in connection with the robbery. 
4. Although their clients were strangers, they had 
criminal records and no apparent legitimate source of such 
sums. 
5. The police and county attorney's office resisted de-
fendants taking the money. 
6. The victims of the robbery had no opportunity to 
protect their interests. 
7. Workman plead guilty to the charge of robbery. 
(Note: State v. Workman, 20 Ut. 2d 178, 435 P2d 919). 
The defendants were in the position of having the 
knowledge or being able readily to obtain the knowledge 
apparent in the instant trial. 
As a matter of law defendants had notice and knowl-
edge of the tainted character of the money and of the in-
firmities of their clients' title. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
JOHNSON IN CONTEMPT IN THE PRESENCE 
OF THE JURY, AND SUCH ACTION WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Section 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides 
for summary punishment of contempt committed in the im-
mediate presence of the court. 
This is in accord with 53 Am. Jur., Trials, §81: 
"During a trial and ini the presence of a jury the 
trial court may cause the arrest and punishment of 
a contumatious witness .... " 
The court's contempt finding added nothing to the ef-
fect already created by Johnson in identifying himself as 
a convict and refusing to answer relevant questions. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT-
TING RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL TO CALL 
JOHNSON AND STOCKTON AFTER HAVING 
BEEN ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD INVOKE 
A PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION 
In the instant case Stockton and Johnson did testify, 
despite occasional resort to the Fifth Amendment (R. 195, 
203, 206). The court gave cautionary instructions to the 
jury. (R. 195, 203, 206). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
In Girrard v. Young, 20 Ut.2d 30, 432 P2d 343, the en-
tire court agreed that: 
"In a civil case where a party invokes the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, it is a circumstance which 
upon a trial the court or jury may consider in con-
nection with all other evidence and may draw an 
inference adverse to that party's interest if they so 
desire." 
The cases cited in plaintiff's brief are otherwise crim-
inal in nature and not apropos. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL ON RESPOND-
ENT'S OPENING STATEMENT ALLUDING TO 
CONFESSIONS, WHICH IN ANY EVENT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL 
It is plaintiff's position that the confessions of Johnson 
and Stockton were admissible for the purpose of showing 
what information would have been available to the de-
fendants if they had made reasonable inquiry, but not for 
the purpose of establishing the truth of such confessions. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs made an offer of proof consistent 
with the opening statement (R. 265). 
Under such circumstances the discretion of the trial 
court in refusing to grant a mistrial was entirely appropri-
ate. See Miller v. Braun, (Kans.) 411 P2d 621, and 88 C.J.S., 
Trials, §161. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RUL-
INGS ON EVIDENCE 
A. The testimony of Mr. Reese with respect to the loss 
paid by the insurance company was entirely compatible 
with establishing the extent of the interest of the insurance 
company in the lawsuit. The exhibit was nothing more 
than confirmation of the payment actually made by the 
insurance company. 
B. The testimony of District Attorney Banks was most 
objective. He did not really answer the allegedly object-
ionable question put to him, but merely stated that which 
was obvious to everybody. 
"And if you could tie the money itself, by identity, 
or identify the individuals, either way, and the 
amounts were the same, if all of those existed, then 
that all would be a circumstance that would point 
toward being involved in the robbery." (R. 318) 
Under direct examination Mr. Banks discussed what 
he understood to be the normal practice of criminal defense 
counsel in obtaining information. The cross-examination 
by plaintiffs was germaine to the state of mind of an at-
torney under the circumstances. 'tt was within the proper 
discretion of the trial court. See Stagmeyer v. Leatham, 20 
Ut 2d 421, 439 P2d 279. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants, as a matter of law, had notice that the 
money they obtained had infirmities in their clients' 
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claimed title to even a part of the monies. In any event, the 
case was fairly submitted to the jury which could not rea-
sonably have come to any other conclusion than that the de-
fendants took the money with notice of its infirmities. Al-
though there were many complicated details involved, the 
substance of the case was clear and without dispute. Rul-
ings on various minor details were of little moment and not 
prejudicial to defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
JAY E. JENSEN 
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